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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, we aim to examine the influence of corporate governance on the audit 
quality of financial report moderated by benevolence. The research data consisted 
of 320 observations from 80 public listed companies in the manufacturing industry 
from 2013-2016. The research model has been tested using a data pool, with 
statistics on Structural Equalization Modeling - Partial Least Square (SEM-PLS). 
The results of the study get empirical evidence that corporate governance has a 
positive effect on audit quality. While benevolence as an independent variable has 
a negative impact on audit quality, however, benevolence as a moderating variable 
strengthens the influence of corporate governance on audit quality. Likewise, SIZE 
as control variables have a positive effect on audit quality, but ROA no impact on 
audit quality and LEV have a negative impact on audit quality. The result of this 
study have implications for investors, company management and regulators, that 
good corporate governance is inseparable from the benevolence of management in 
managing the company as a way to improve audit quality, is something essential 
and needs attention from all parties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The number of companies that fail is not just because of competition, but because 
poor of corporate governance practices and audit quality, corporate governance and 
audit quality are essential for benevolence if we want to ensure business 
sustainability is maintained. Because corporate governance and good audit quality 
are crucial factors in the sustainability of the company's operations and maintaining 
trust from the investor community. 
Rahman & Bremer (2016) states that good corporate governance will produce 
accurate and trusted financial reports, while bad governance usually followed by the 
practice of corporate scandals, fraud and fraud that will deliver financial reports 
which are inaccurate and potentially can cause loss of trust in financial statements. 
Similarly, the role of external auditors, users of financial statements view the task of 
external auditors as not only seeing compliance with regulations and audit 
standards, but are expected to be able to detect and report fraud and fraud that can 
cause loss of trust in financial statements (Lee, Ali, & Gloeck, 2008). Auditors are 
also expected to be able to carry out their duties professionally to be able to enforce 
the law when examining their clients' financial statements (Ang & Lim, 2008). 
Because according to Imhoff Jr (2003), financial reports that have integrity and 
trustworthiness cannot be separated and are always closely related to corporate 
governance and auditing. 
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Also, according to Eilifsen & Willekens (2008) good corporate governance and 
external audit of financial statements, it should lead to reasonable guarantees about 
financial statements as the definitive source that can be used by stakeholders and 
shareholders outside the company. For that, the practice of good corporate 
governance and audit quality in public companies is essential because public 
companies should be trusted. However, current corporate governance practices and 
audit quality still hold a big question mark for users of financial statements, whether 
corporate governance practices can affect audit quality to be more qualified and 
implemented based on benevolence from company management and auditors. Due, 
there are still many cases of corporate financial scandals in the past in two decades 
that have been revealed to the public and continue to this day, which is the 
motivation for this research. 
This research focuses on the effects of corporate governance on audit quality 
moderated by benevolence because according to the expectations of researchers’ 
audit quality is inseparable and is always related to the practice of corporate 
governance and good intentions from company management and auditors who carry 
out audit functions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Corporate governance and audit quality  
Cadbury (1993) describes that corporate governance as a structure that directs and 
regulates business to reach a balance between the authority needed by the 
business, ensuring continuity, presence and responsibility to shareholders and 
stakeholders linked to controlling the jurisdiction of the owner, manager, shareholder 
and other stakeholders. 
Control and ownership are always associated with the agency issue, along with 
information between management and absentee owners, creating demand for 
external audit (Lin & Hwang, 2010). In traditionally, DeAngelo (1981) defined that 
audit quality as the joint probability of discovering material misrepresentations and 
reporting them when they exist that an existing problem is discovered and reported 
by the auditors. 
Corporate governance in academic studies of auditing is usually considered solely 
in its relation to auditor quality, i.e. Beisland, Mersland, & Strøm (2015) focused on 
audit fee and the presence of internal auditors; Chang, Chi, Hwang, & Shiue (2015) 
going concern opinion; Chu, Mathieu, & Mbagwu (2009) auditor’s industrial 
specialization; Ejeagbasi, Nweze, Ezeh, & Nze (2015) Auditor Size and Lin & Hwang 
(2010) Auditor tenure, auditor size, audit fee, and auditor specialization. 
The relationship between corporate governance and audit quality was investigated 
by a large and growing body of literature (Beisland et al., 2015; Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2010; Chang et al., 2015; Chu et al., 2009; Ejeagbasi et 
al., 2015; H. Y. Lee & Jahng, 2008; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Park, Shin, & Suh, 2013; 
Velury, Reisch, & O'reilly, 2003; Yeoh & Jubb, 2001). Previous studies have shown 
that firms with stronger corporate governance structures require improved quality of 
audit (Carcello et al., 2010; Riguen, Kachouri & Jarboui, 2018) and have reported 
financial trust (Rahman & Bremer, 2016). 
In this context, the impact of corporate governance and quality of audit on 
microfinance sectors in the 70 developed countries was examined in research 
undertaken by Beisland et al. (2015). The empirical outcome discovered a 
favourable relationship between corporate governance and quality of audit. Similar 
study conducted by Makni, Kolsi, & Affes (2012) using 29 Tunisian companies as 
an observation sample during 2005-2009, claims that corporate governance 
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measured by duality boards has a beneficial impact on audit quality, and Gul & 
Leung (2004) also reported a favourable connection between corporate governance 
measured by duality boards and audit quality (proxy by audit fee). In the same 
research, 
Beasley & Petroni, 2001 undertook the same study; Carcello et al., (2010); Lennox, 
(2005) states that corporate governance through director from external favours the 
efficiency of the supervisory function of the board and influences board choices in 
selecting a better quality of audit. 
Overall, some proof appears to suggest that corporate governance has a positive 
influence on audit qualities. Our hypothesis is, therefore, as follows: 
H1: There is a positive correlation between corporate governance on audit quality. 
 
2.2. Benevolence and audit quality. 
Benevolence (goodwill), in the context of this study defined as the auditor's ability to 
carry out his duties by professionally and responsibly with upholding integrity, based 
on good intentions that can provide mutual satisfaction between the auditor and 
auditee without sacrificing the public interest. Auditors and auditees not only pursue 
the interests of big business profits but can realise satisfaction and public trust 
because benevolence is a spirit inherent in corporate governance and auditors to 
produce quality and reliable financial reports. The numbers and information 
contained in the financial statements are managed and made in good faith so that 
they can provide benefits and benefits to others, and protect the interests of users 
of financial statement information. Benevolence, according to Kim, Ferrin, & Rao 
(2003), includes attention, empathy, confidence and acceptability. 
Professional auditor in public accountant firms must meet professional standards in 
working with their client. But may also face pressure from both their clients and firms 
when making ethical decisions (Hageman & Fisher, 2016).  It has long been 
suspected that the financial interests auditors have in their clients can adversely 
affect their independence (AICPA, 1978; Mautz & Sharaf, 1961). There is a 
tendency, the auditor's dependence on the audited party, in theory, has a negative 
impact on auditor quality (DeAngelo 1981) and has a negative effect on virtue and 
ethics that the auditor must uphold as an independent party. All overall, the findings 
of the Chen, Sun, & Wu (2010) study show that auditors in China are more likely to 
compromise towards audit quality for clients economically important when an 
institution protects weak investors. Hence, DeAngelo (1981) stated that incumbent 
auditors not expected to be entirely independent of their client, as the latter can 
impose a real cost on the former by terminating the bilateral relationship. 
Furthermore, Chen et al., (2010) stated that it is ceteris paribus the more significant 
the client in auditor’s portfolio, the stronger should be the incentive that the auditor 
has to retain that client. And thus possibility compromise audit quality and unethical 
behaviour are more likely when the firms’ ethical climate emphasises individual 
decision-making as guided by employees’ sense of personal morality (Hageman & 
Fisher, 2016) and tend to ignore benevolence on their professionalism. Hence our 
hypothesis as follows: 
H2. There is a negative correlation between benevolence and audit quality. 
 
 
2.3. The moderating effect of benevolence on the impact of corporate 
governance on audit quality. 
Chen et al., (2010), studied regarding the relationships among economic 
importance, institutional improvements and audit quality in the context of China, in 
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the level of office and individual. The empirical result shows that at the individual 
level modified audit opinion (MAO) negatively correlated with client necessary. 
Otherwise, when the institutional environment becomes more investor-friendly, the 
propensity to issue MAO is positively associated with client importance. The client 
importance measured at the office level is also negatively related to the propensity 
for MAO without controlling for the auditor-level client important. The result of this 
study that (1) Institutional improvements encourage auditors to prioritise the 
compromising performance over the financial advantages acquired by the significant 
client; and (2) the effect of client significance on audit quality choices seem to differ 
at the auditor level and the office level. 
In addition, a study conducted by Hageman & Fisher (2016) on the influence of client 
attributes and organisational climate on tax (including) audit professionals on the 
relationship between benevolence and quality of service in public accounting firms. 
This study found that the client service climates were stronger among ethical 
environments that emphasised the following rules and codes of law as those with 
an emphasis on benevolence or doing what is best for others. These findings 
suggest that a positive service climate, where auditors perceive that the firm’s 
practice, procedure and behaviour than expected, supported, and rewarded 
contribute toward service excellence (Schneider, White, & Paul, 1998). 
In their study, Aschauer, Fink, Moro, van Bakel-Auer, & Warming-Rasmussen 
(2016) the relationship between auditors’ identification-based trust in client firms’ 
manager (CEOs/CFOs) and their perceptions of auditors’ professional scepticism 
data collected from 233 auditor-client dyads in Germany. The study conclusion is 
auditors’ identification-based trust is positively associated with their clients’ 
perception of the professional scepticism. 
The other study conducted by Garrett, Hoitash, & Prawitt (2014) the relationship 
between trust with attributes ability, integrity and benevolence (following Mayer, 
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995 models) on financial reporting quality (with attributed: 
accrual quality, misstatements and internal control). The study concluded that trust 
(ability, integrity and benevolence) positively associated with financial reporting 
quality, especially to internal control as parts of audit quality. 
Ogbeibu, Senadjki, & Gaskin (2018) conducted a study on the relationship between 
the impact of organisational culture on employee creativity of Nigerian 
manufacturing industries. The empirical results show that top management leaders’ 
benevolence is moderating positive and significant effect on the impact of 
organisational culture and employee creativity. Hence our hypothesis as follows: 
H3: The benevolence strengthens of corporate governance correlation on audit 
quality. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
RESEARCH METHOD AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
This study focused on exploring the influence of corporate governance composite of 
45 items covering a broad category of dimension, i.e. 1). Effectiveness of boards; 
2). accountability of external & risk; 3). Remuneration and rewards; 4). Shareholder 
relations and 5). Stakeholder relations (from now on referred to as EARSS) on the 
audit quality measured by four attributed, i.e. 1). Audit fee, 2). Audit industrial 
specialist, 3). Auditor size and 4) audit tenure (from now on referred to as FISST) 
moderated by benevolence on manufacture industries public listed company in 
Indonesia. 
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Figure 1: Research Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Research Method 
In order to test the hypotheses and the empirical analysis, a regression model 
modified from the research of Husnin et al., (2016) and Lin & Liu (2009) to estimate 
the relationship based on the following research model 
 
CG = β0+β1AQ+β2BN+β3(AQ*BN)+β4SIZE+β5ROA+β6LEV+ε 
 
Notes: CG = Corporate Governance; AQ = Audit Quality; BN = Benevolence;  
 SIZE = Company Size; ROA = Return on Asset; LEV = Leverage 
 
3.3. Measurement of Variables  
 Research variables, both dependent, independent and control variables are 
measured from each company “i” in the year “t” during the observation period 
as shown in exhibit 2: 
 
Table 1: Statutory Variables Measurements 
Variables Symbols Measures Authors 
Audit 
Quality 
AQ Audit quality measured by four audit quality 
attributes (FISST): 
1. Audit fee: Ln of audit fees per year paid by 
the company to the auditors.  
2. Auditor’s industrial specialist: Percentage of 
total auditor market share by industry.  
3. Auditor size: Total number of auditor’s client 
4. Audit tenure: The total length of auditor’s 
tenure with the company. 
Chang et al., 2015; 
Chu et al., 2009; 
Park et al., 2013; 
Riguen et al., 2018; 
Sailendra, 
Murwaningsari, & 
Mayangsari, 2019.  
Corporate 
Governance 
CG Independent variables: Corporate governance 
index composite of forty-five items, covering 
five broad categories of dimensions: 
effectiveness of boards; Accountability of 
external & risk; Remuneration & Rewards; 
Shareholder relations and Stakeholder relations 
(EARSS). 
IOD, 2017; Riguen 
et al., 2018; 
Sailendra, 2019. 
H2 
H1 
CG AQ 
BN 
E. of Boards 
Ext. Acc. & Risk 
Rem. & Reward 
Shareholder Rel. 
Stakeholder Re. 
Audit Fee 
Auditor I. Spec. 
Auditor’s Size 
Audit Tenure 
1. SIZE 
2. ROA 
3. LEV 
H3 
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Benevolence BN Moderating variables: Number of attributes for 
the company i divided by total (seven attributes) 
Ogbeibu et al., 
2018; Sailendra, 
2019. 
Size SIZE Ln of the total asset at the end of year Garrett et al., 2014; 
Riguen et al., 2018; 
Sailendra et al., 
2019. 
Return on 
Asset 
ROA The ratio of earnings before tax divided by total 
assets. 
Garrett et al., 2014; 
Riguen et al., 2018; 
Sailendra et al., 
2019. 
Leverage LEV The Total ratio debt divided by total assets. Garrett et al., 2014; 
Riguen et al., 2018; 
Sailendra et al., 
2019. 
 
3.1. Data Collection and sample size 
Research sample data are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) originally from 146 companies. The data’s taken from the database 
of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and the Accounting Professional 
Development Center (P2PK) of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia. 
After selection based on predetermined criteria, some companies did not disclose 
their audit fee data and also did not meet corporate governance indicators; there are 
66 companies dropped from the research sample. So that the final data used as 
samples for this study were 80 companies or 320 years-observation. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  N Min Max Mean SD 
Audit Quality 
(FISST) 
Audit Fee 320 7.81 10.60 25.78 15.24 
Auditor’s industrial specialist 320 1.00 2.00 1.33 0.47 
Auditor’s size 320 1.26 3.34 2.93 0.32 
Auditor’s tenure 320 1.00 7.00 2.93 1.62 
Corporate 
Governance 
(EARSS) 
Effectiveness of Boards 320 2.22 20.00 11.49 3.34 
Accountability of External & risk 320 6.67 17.78 12.89 2.47 
Remuneration and Rewards 320 0.00 17.78 4.66 5.43 
Shareholder relation 320 4.44 11.11 6.17 1.81 
Stakeholder relation 320 0.00 13.13 6.92 3.94 
Variabel 
moderating 
Benevolence 320 0.00 14.29 6.64 2.66 
Variabel control Company Size (SIZE) 320 10.99 14.42 12.42 0.70 
Return on asset (ROA) 320 -0.21 0.66 0.05 0.09 
Leverage (LEV) 320 0.04 1.25 0.50 0.22 
Source: SPSS statistical Ver.23 output, processing by authors 
 
4.2. Analysis and results 
The results of the study and statistical testing of the relationship between variables 
are described in Table no. 3. 
 
 
 7 
Table 3: Statistical Results 
 Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
T Statistic 
(│O/STDE│) 
   P Values 
CG → AQ 0.198 0.206 0.059 3.324         0.000*** 
BN → AQ -0.083 -0.087 0.050 1.675        0.047** 
Z1 → AQ 0.081 0.077 0.041 1.968        0.025** 
SIZE → AQ 0.619 0.617 0.046 13.362 0.000*** 
ROA → AQ -0.014 -0.016 0.040 0.355      0.361 
LEV → AQ -0.117 -0.118 0.041 2.873         0.002** 
Source: Smart-PLS 3.0 output, processing by authors 
The symbols: ***, **, * denote significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: CG = corporate governance; AQ = audit quality; BN = benevolence; Z1 = 
moderating effect (CG*BN); SIZE = company size; ROA = return on asset 
and LEV = leverage.  
 
As presented in Table no. 3, the results show that Corporate Governance (CG) as 
defined by effectiveness of boards, accountability of external and risk, remuneration 
and reward, shareholder relation and stakeholder relation (EARSS) has positive 
impact on Audit Quality (AQ) as defined by audit fee, auditor industrial specialist, 
auditor size and audit tenure (FISST) indicated by the p-value 0,000. The conclusion 
that good corporate governance practice has a positive relationship on audit quality, 
it is supported the previous research by  (Beisland et al., 2015; Collier & Gregory, 
1996; Gul & Leung, 2004; Makni et al., 2012). And also this empirical research found 
in line by a previous empirical study by Carcello et al., 2010; Riguen et al., 2018 
stated that good corporate governance structure demands better audit quality and 
more trusted financial report (Rahman & Bremer, 2016) and it is reflecting of audit 
quality of financial report. 
Benevolence has a negative impact on audit quality as shown in the Table No.3 with 
statistical p-value 0.047 and negative sign in the original sample (O) -0.083 and in 
the sample mean (M) value -0.087. This evidence indicates that in stand-alone 
benevolence cannot playing a vital role to influence audit quality without supported 
by good corporate governance practice. This empirical evidence supported 
statements stated by DeAngelo (1981) that incumbent auditor is not always 
expected to be entirely independent of their client, especially on the more significant 
the client in auditor’s portfolio. The stringer should be incentive that the auditors 
have to retain that client and thus possibility compromise audit quality (Chen et al., 
2010), then unethical behaviour is more likely when the firms’ ethical climate 
emphasis by individual decision-making as guided by employee’s sense of personal 
morality (Hageman & Fisher, 2016). Due, it is indicated by a negative relationship 
between benevolence and audit quality in this study. 
Otherwise, corporate governance moderated by benevolence strengthening the 
audit quality. That is means that good organisational governance structure and 
practice will more strengthen audit quality moderated by benevolence with pleasant 
ethical climate and environment in organisation culture (Chen et al., 2010; Hageman 
& Fisher, 2016). Better corporate governance structure and practice with 
environmental of organizational ethical culture Ogbeibu et al., 2018; and auditors’ 
identification-based trust is positively associate by auditors’ client perceptions of 
their professional scepticism (Aschauer et al., 2016), and benevolence as a 
moderating variable combine with good governance structure and practice will 
positive significant on audit quality. 
The control variables, company size (SIZE) is a positive correlation with audit quality 
(AQ); which indicate that bigger company size will provide more resources, 
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technology, expertise and capability they have to support output quality of work 
prepared by management to verified by external auditors and it implies on audit 
quality. Return of asset (ROA) no effect on audit quality but in the original sample 
(O) statistic value is a negative sign, that indicates that ROA is potential have a 
negative impact on audit quality due agency problem if any compromise between 
auditee and auditor on that. And then, leverage (DAR) negatively correlated with 
audit quality; it is indicating that more high leverage owing by company, that the 
health of financial ability. And it is a signal of distress and bankruptcy always 
perception by the public, then as a potential area to compromised between auditee 
and auditor for company management interest, due negative relation between 
leverage and audit quality on this study. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study empirically examines the corporate governance influence through six 
dimensions, i.e. effectiveness of boards, accountability of external and risk, 
remuneration and rewards, shareholder relations and stakeholder relations 
(EARSS) on audit quality attribute by audit fees, auditor industrial specialist, auditor 
size and audit tenure (FISST). Total observation for this study is 320 years-
observation from 80 public listed manufacturing companies on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (IDX) from 2013-2016. 
The results of our study provide empirical research that corporate governance 
positively correlation on audit quality, which can be explained that good corporate 
governance structure positive and demand better audit quality (Beisland et al., 2015; 
Carcello et al., 2010; Collier & Gregory, 1996; Gul & Leung, 2004; Makni et al., 2012; 
Riguen et al., 2018) and more trusted financial report (Rahman & Bremer, 2016). 
Benevolence is a negative correlation on audit quality, this explains that in stand-
alone benevolence can be compromised by auditee and auditor for interest of 
management and auditors if supported by an ethical behaviour of corporate culture 
with managerial benevolence own sense of personal morality (Chen et al., 2010; 
DeAngelo, 1981; Hageman & Fisher, 2016). And as moderating variable 
benevolence strengthening the correlation between corporate governance and audit 
quality, this can be explained that good corporate governance structure and practice 
and benevolence with proper climate emphasis of organizational culture and good 
ethical personal morality is positive significant on audit quality. For this reason, 
especially for regulator and company management to encourage good corporate 
governance structure and practice with strengthening environmental, ethical 
corporate culture as a way to improve audit quality and trusted from investor and 
public. 
Due to the small size data sample used and short of time horizons, the results of 
this study cannot be generalised for all industry types. In the future research needs 
to include other independent variables such as intellectual capital, the structure of 
capital, social environment, corporate culture and also need to expand of auditor 
quality attributes such as audit opinion, going concern, workload pressure, partner 
tenure to enrichment and more comprehensive of evidence in the future. Base on 
previous research, the result of this study contribute to the literature and could 
constitute a reference for future research. Notably for benevolence variable as a 
new paradigm to study corporate governance and audit quality correlated with 
trusted and quality of the financial report as our significant contribution for future 
research references, especially in the emerging economic country, such as 
Indonesia. 
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